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ANTITRUST LAW-STANDING TO SUE--PRICES-CONSUMERS ARE PRECLUDED
FROM SHOWING "INJURY" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECnON 4 OF THE CLAY-
TON ACT BY ESTABLISHING THAT THEY PAD HIGHER PRICES FOR GOODS
BECAUSE OF ILLEGAL PRICE-FIXING OF A MANUFACTURER WITH WHOM THEY
DID NOT DEAL DncrLY.-Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
The State of Illinois,1 in a treble-damage civil antitrust action under
section 4 of the Clayton Act,2 accused concrete block manufacturers of
conspiring to fix prices of blocks used in the construction of public build-
ings in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 Illinois alleged that
the blocks were sold at artificially high prices to various general and
specific contractors, who in turn overcharged the State.
4
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that
only direct purchasers could sue for the alleged overcharge.5 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
indirect purchasers could recover treble-damages for an illegal overcharge
if they could prove that the overcharge was passed on to them through
the intermediate distribution channels. 6 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held: Reversed. Consumers are precluded from showing
"injury" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act by establishing
that they paid higher prices for goods because of illegal price-fixing of a
manufacturer with whom they did not deal directly.
7
1. The suit was brought by the State on behalf of itself and 700 local govern-
mental entities in the greater Chicago area. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), which provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district
court of the. United States . . . without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations is declared to be illegal.
4. In this case plaintiffs sought to demonstrate that masonry contractors, who
had incorporated defendants' blocks into walls and other masonry structures, passed
on the alleged overcharge to general contractors, who incorporated the masonry
structures into entire buildings, and that the general contractors in turn passed on
the overcharge to plaintiffs in the bids submitted for those buildings.
5. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 468 (N.D. I11. 1975). The
district court relied on a past Supreme Court decision, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
6. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976).
7. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977).
CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes a private right of action for
violation of the antitrust laws. Congress broadly defined the parties who
could maintain such a suit as "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws ... ." 8 A person who has purchased goods directly from
an alleged price-fixer need only establish a prima facie showing of
an illegal overcharge in order to seek redress.9 However, often a business
which has been overcharged as a result of price-fixing simply raises its
prices to reflect the overcharge, a practice known as "passing-on" the illegal
increment of cost. Thus, distributors may avoid the consequences of price-
fixing violations committed by those preceeding them in the distribution
chain, and as a result it is the ultimate consumer who actually is injured
by the overcharge. 10
Passing-on was developed originally as a defense asserted by alleged
price-fixers to suits brought by the direct purchasers of their goods." The
defendants contended that the direct purchasers suffered no injury be-
cause the added cost due to the illegal price agreement had been passed
on to their customers. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.,12 the Supreme Court held that the passing-on theory was no defense
to a suit brought by direct purchasers. Defendant United Shoe refused
to sell rather than lease its shoe manufacturing equipment; plaintiff Han-
over Shoe alleged that this resulted in higher costs and violated the anti-
trust laws. United Shoe contended that the plaintiff was not injured
because it had passed on the economic disadvantages by raising the price
of its shoes.'3
The Court rejected this argument, finding that the injury was complete
and legally actionable when the overcharge was paid. The Court stated
that recognition of the passing-on defense would present insurmountable
problems of proof because of the difficulty of tracing the economic effect
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
488 (1968); Handler and Bleckman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy
of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 638 (1976);
Pollock, Standing To Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine, 32
A.B.A. AN'rrTxUST L.J. 5, 7 (1966).
10. MecGuire, The Passing-on Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to
Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PIr. L. REv. 177, 181 (1971).
11. Cases denying the defense include: Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964); Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric
Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. General Electric
Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1964). Cases allowing the defense include:
Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3rd Cir. 1962);
Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441. (4th Cir. 1958); Clark Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
12. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
13. Id. at 491-92.
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of the overcharge for equipment to the price charged for a pair of shoes. 14
The Court also feared that recognition of the passing-on defense would
permit antitrust violators to go unpunished by removing from the con-
troversy the plaintiff with the greatest incentive to prosecute and leaving
enforcement to parties with insignificant claims, such as the purchasers
of a single pair of shoes.15
However, the Hanover Shoe Court also indicated that the passing-on
defense might be appropriate when the absence of actual injury to the
direct purchaser was easily ascertainable, as for example, where sales were
made pursuant to a "cost-plus" contract between the direct and indirect
purchasers. Here the direct purchaser is completely reimbursed for all his
costs, and receives a fixed fee which represents his profit.16
Lower court decisions conflicted as to the effect of Hanover Shoe on the
right of indirect purchasers to recover when they could prove that over-
charges were passed on to them, causing injury under section 4 of the
Clayton Act.17 Some courts interpreted Hanover Shoe as limiting recovery
to the initial purchaser in the chain of distribution, reasoning that Hanover
Shoe held, as a matter of law, that proof of passing-on is precluded absent
a cost-plus or similar arrangement."' These courts also asserted that af-
fording standing to indirect purchasers while denying the defendant the
opportunity to show that a particular purchaser passed on the overcharge
would expose defendants to multiple liability by allowing both direct and
indirect purchasers to recover for the same overcharge. 19
14. Id. at 492-93.
15. Id. at 494.
16. Id.
17. The following cases held that Hanover Shoe forecloses plaintiffs from showing
passing-on: Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. " 74,235 (N.D.
Cal.); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971); Philadelphia
Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438
F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp.
319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Cases holding that Hanover Shoe does not restrict standing are: In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974);
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. ff 74,680 (D. Conn.); Boshes
v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. I11. 1973); Southern Gen. Builders,
Inc. v. Maule Indus. Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. ff 74,484 (S.D. Fla. 1972). See West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971).
18. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1970).




The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,20 rejected these arguments and refused to
confine standing under section 4 to direct purchasers or to indirect pur-
chasers who bought pursuant to a cost-plus contract. The court allowed
governmental consumers to recover against the manufacturers even though
the asphalt had been purchased by general contractors, who had passed
on the anticompetitive prices in their bids for highway projects.
Several other courts 21 and most commentators 22 also rejected the pro-
position that Hanover Shoe precluded proof of passing-on as a theory of
recovery. They perceived Hanover Shoe as one of a long line of cases
which emphasized the protection of the treble-damage remedy as a primary
enforcement mechanism of the antitrust laws, thus favoring offensive
passing-on because it would ensure that the party suffering injury had a
remedy available to him.25
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick settled the dispute among the lower
courts by rejecting offensive passing-on.24 Mr. Justice White, writing for
the majority, first reasoned that offensive passing-on as a theory of recovery
would be inconsistent with the restrictions on the defensive use of passing-on
enunciated in Hanover Shoe.25  He pointed out the inequity of exposing a
defendant to multiple liability by allowing an indirect purchaser to use
the passing-on theory to recover damages from a defendant while prohibit-
ing the defendant from asserting a passing-on defense against a direct
purchaser. An indirect purchaser could recover an overcharge proven to
have been passed-on to him without prejudicing the rights of a direct
purchaser also to recover the full amount of the overcharge. 26  Either
Hanover Shoe must be overruled or narrowly limited to its facts, the
Court reasoned, or the use of offensive passing-on must be barred.2t
20. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
21. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
22. See, e.g., McGuire, The Passing-on Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers
to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PrrT. L. REv. 177 (1971);
Schaefer, Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 16 WM. AND MARY L. REV. '883 (1975); Comment, Mangano and
Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLuM. L.
REv. 394 (1972); Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe On the Offensive Use of the
Passing-on Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 98 (1972); Comment, Standing to Sue in
Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-on, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 976 (1975).
But see Handler and Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of
Parens Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976).
23. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589, 594 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
24. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
25. Id. at 728.
26. Id. at 730.
27. Id. at 736.
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In choosing to reject offensive passing-on, the Court declared that its
use would unduly complicate antitrust suits because of the difficulty of
tracing the complex economic adjustments involved in a change in the
cost of a particular product. The majority was unwilling to burden the
courts with the task of tracing the effects of an illegal overcharge to direct
purchasers on prices consumers paid for goods.
28
The antitrust laws would be more effectively enforced, the Court argued,
by concentrating the full recovery in the direct purchasers. Allowing in-
direct purchasers to recover would reduce seriously the incentive to sue
by dividing the potential recovery among a much larger group and increas-
ing the overall cost of recovery. Thus, the policy of encouraging vigorous
private enforcement of the antitrust laws was viewed as supporting ad-
herence to Hanover Shoe and rejection of offensive passing-on as a theory
of recovery.2
9
Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, condemned the majority's ruling as being
a "regrettable retreat" from the broad objectives of compensation and
deterrence set out in section 4 of the Clayton Act.30 These goals are
frustrated, he claimed, by the fact that often direct purchasers who act as
middlemen may have little incentive to sue suppliers if they are able to
pass on the bulk of the overcharge to the ultimate consumer. By preclud-
ing an indirect consumer, who actually suffers, from maintaining suit, anti-
trust violators go unpunished and victims remain uncompensated. Because
there is no danger in the offensive passing-on situation that the price-fixer
will escape liability, Justice Brennan contended that there were "sound
reasons for treating offensive and defensive passing-on differently." "
The dissent dismissed the argument that allowing passing-on would
involve long and complicated proceedings by pointing out that this is
generally true of all antitrust cases. Existing procedural mechanisms were
considered capable of virtually eliminating the danger of multiple liability.
Thus, the dissent felt the proper resolution of Illinois Brick would be to
limit Hanover Shoe to cases of defensive passing-on where direct and
indirect purchasers are not parties to the same action. 2
The principle objective of the antitrust laws is to promote competition
by proscribing certain types of market conduct thought to lead to monopoli-
zation, such as collusive price-fixing.38 To further the goal of free com-
petition, Congress enacted a "drastic remedy," section 4 of the Clayton Act,
which allows victims of antitrust violations to recover three times the actual,
demonstrable damages. The treble-damage action not only punishes the
violator but also compensates the injured party. Moreover, Congress sought
28. Id. at 741-42.
29. Id. at 745-46.
30. Id. at 748-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 753-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 14 (1977).
1977]
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to provide an incentive for private enforcement of antitrust laws and make
compliance with the antitrust laws less costly than violations .
4
The impact of Illinois Brick on the scheme of enforcement envisioned
by Congress is anomolous. The Court's ruling in effect permits a direct
purchaser to recover four times the amount of overcharge due to an anti-
trust violation-once from its customers, the indirect purchasers, and three
times the amount from the violator. Thus, direct purchasers receive a
windfall, whereas the true victims go uncompensated.35
Moreover, in man), situations offensive passing-on would be the only
way to ensure punishment of antitrust violators. For a number of reasons,
the direct purchaser may be unwilling to pursue the statutory remedy. A
direct purchaser often will fear that litigation will result in boycotts or
discrimination. The threat of disrupting a stable business relationship or
losing a reliable source of supply will inhibit many direct purchasers from
enforcing the antitrust laws.36 These considerations may outweigh the
lure of treble damages, especially when the economic detriment arising
from a violation can be passed on to customers. Preventing the indirect
purchaser from suing in these situations may virtually guarantee that the
violator will go unpunished.
Thus, the Illinois Brick decision cannot be rationalized within the frame-
work of traditional antitrust enforcement policy. However, the majority
expressed two major concerns with the effects of offensive passing-on which
were so problematic as to override any negative impact on antitrust policy:
the danger of multiple liability for the violator and the undue complexity
involved in proving passing-on.
The danger of multiple liability is a legitimate concern. However, it
has been argued persuasively 37 that procedural devices such as statutory
interpleader,38 intervention,39 joinder of parties, 40 interdistrict transfer and
consolidation of cases,41 the four-year statute of limitations 42 and the
doctrine of collateral estoppel would provide relief for the violator. Per-
haps the most satisfactory solution is the apportionment of damages pro-
posed by the Ninth Circuit.43 This plan would allow the intermediary to
34. See Schaefer, supra note 22, at 908.
35. See Pollock, supra note 9, at 38.
36. See Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-on
Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 98, 112 (1972).
37. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198-201 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589, 596-97 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).
43. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
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recover the amount of the overcharge not passed on as well as lost profits
shown to have resulted from the increased costs. The indirect purchaser
could recover the remainder of the overcharge and any other damages
proximately caused.
This approach has the advantage of allowing all parties with demon-
strable damages to recover, and also ensures the existence of a viable
plaintiff to prosecute the antitrust violator. However, the apportionment
plan conflicts with the principle established by Hanover Shoe, that the
direct purchasers are entitled to recover the entire amount of the over-
charge without regard to any passing-on. 44  But Hanover Shoe did not
confront the situation where both direct and indirect purchasers were
potential plaintiffs. Moreover, the rationale of Hanover Shoe was that
direct purchasers should be able to recover, even though they passed on
the injury, in order to guarantee private prosecution of Sherman Act viola-
tions. Thus, Hanover Shoe should not inhibit fashioning a remedy such
as apportionment where the policies of deterrence and compensation are
accommodated.
The problem of demonstrating an injury due to passing-on is amenable
to solution through the use of expert witnesses. 45 The extent to which an
overcharge 'can be passed on depends upon the elasticity of consumer
demand and the elasticity of supply in the market in which the direct
purchaser sells. 46 Economists are capable of analyzing the market effect
presumably with the same degree of assurance that other market phenon-
ena are analyzed. Statistical techniques exist to measure the elasticities
of supply and demand in a given market. Even assuming that difficulties
of proof exist, conclusively foreclosing a remedy is not justified. 47  Most
treble-damage antitrust actions are complicated and require the use of
sophisticated analytical techniques in order to isolate the consequences of
illegal market activity from the adverse effects of general market condi-
tions.48 Indirect purchasers should have at least the opportunity to prove
that they did suffer injury.
The Illinois Brick decision also poses a threat to the scope of the re-
cently enacted Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197649
that was intended to permit state Attorneys General to file suits on behalf
of consumers within the state. Advocates of the legislation intended that
parens patriae suits be permissible on behalf of both direct and indirect
consumers, relying on the language of section 4 of the Clayton Act which
44. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
45. See Schaefer, supra note 22, at 916.
46. Id. at 915.
47. See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. if 74,680,
at 94,979 (D. Conn.).
48. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 758-59 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
49. Pub. L. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
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does not itself restrict the class of potential plaintiffs to direct purchasers.5 0
Illinois Brick's restrictive interpretation of section 4 seriously undermines
the objectives of the new legislation.
Perhaps the best solution was suggested in the majority's opinion in
Illinois Brick, where Justice White pointed out that Congress was free to
amend section 4 to permit recovery by indirect consumers. 51 Hopefully,
Congress will react to the Illinois Brick decision and thus keep the doors
of the federal courts open to ultimate consumers who often bear the eco-
nomic burden of remote violations of the antitrust laws.
CATHERINE F. KLExN
50. Rep. Rodino, a sponsor, stated during the House debates:
[A]ssuming the State attorney general proves a violation, and proves that
an overcharge was 'passed on' to the consumers, injuring them 'in their
property'; that is, their pocket books-recoveries are authorized by the
compromise bill whether or not the consumers purchased directly from the
price-fixer, or indirectly, from intermediaries, retailers, or middlemen. The
technical and procedural argument the consumers have no 'standing'
whenever they are not in privity with the price-fixer, and have not purchased
directly from him, is rejected by the compromise bill. Opinions relying on
this procedural technicality . . . are squarely rejected by the compromise
bill.
16 CoNG. REc. H10,295 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976).
51. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 733-34 n.14 (1977).
[ Vol. 46
